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Cigarette smoking is a public health problem of staggering proportions.
According to a 2014 report of the U.S. Surgeon General, more than twenty
million Americans have died because of smoking in the last fifty years; 2.5
million of those deaths were nonsmokers who were exposed to secondhand
smoke.1 Although the tobacco control movement has helped to reduce
dramatically the death and disease attributable to smoking, smoking is still the
leading cause of preventable death in the United States.2 If persons under the
age of eighteen were to continue to smoke at the current rate, 5.6 million children
alive today would die prematurely from a smoking-related illness.3 Further, the
burden of tobacco use is not shared equally. Tobacco use hits certain
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1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—
50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 1 (2014), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-ofprogress/full-report.pdf.
2. Id. at 6, 11, 17.
3. Id. at 12.
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populations particularly hard, with “disparities in tobacco use . . . across groups
defined by race, ethnicity, educational level, and socioeconomic status.”4
The same 2014 report concluded that tobacco-related death and disease is
“overwhelmingly caused by cigarettes and other combusted tobacco products,”
and recommended the “rapid elimination of their use.”5 Indeed, some have
advocated for the elimination of cigarettes, or all combustible tobacco products,
from the marketplace as part of a tobacco “end game” strategy.6 To date,
however, no jurisdiction has taken this dramatic step, potentially because of the
challenging politics such a policy would implicate.7
Even in the absence of a prohibition on the sale of combustible tobacco
products, it is possible that less comprehensive policy options would
dramatically reduce cigarette-related death and disease. One such option relates
to the elimination of a particularly detrimental combustible tobacco product:
menthol cigarettes. Menthol is an organic additive used in cigarettes with
analgesic cooling properties that reduce the harshness of tobacco smoke and the
irritation of nicotine.8 Marketed as a characterizing flavor in cigarettes, menthol
makes it easier to start smoking and harder to quit smoking.9 The disparities
present in tobacco use generally are even more acute with menthol cigarette use
as menthol-flavored cigarettes are targeted to and used disproportionately by
groups with higher incidences of tobacco use, such as adolescents and
minorities.10
Restricting the presence of menthol in cigarettes would benefit public health
and reduce cigarette-related death and disease.11 For example, a recent study
showed that 38.9% of menthol smokers would quit in response to a prohibition
on menthol cigarettes, including 44.5% of African American and 44% of female
menthol smokers.12
To combat the problem of cigarette smoking and other forms of tobacco use,
Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

4. Id. at 7.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Robert N. Proctor, Why Ban the Sale of Cigarettes? The Case for Abolition, 22
TOBACCO CONTROL i27, i27 (2013).
7. See Mitchell Zeller et al., The Strategic Dialogue on Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Vision
and Blueprint for Action in the U.S., 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 324, 325‒26 (2009).
8. TOBACCO PRODUCTS SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM., MENTHOL CIGARETTES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH: REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2011),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/TobaccoProd
uctsScientificAdvisoryCommittee/UCM269697.pdf [hereinafter TPSAC REPORT].
9. Id. at 2, 149.
10. Id. at 41, 76, 92, 150.
11. See id. at 225 (making the “overall recommendation” that “removal of menthol cigarettes
from the marketplace would benefit public health in the United States”).
12. Jennifer L. Pearson et al., A Ban on Menthol Cigarettes: Impact on Public Opinion and
Smokers’ Intention to Quit, 102 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH e107, e111‒12 (2012).
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(FSPTCA) in 2009.13 This Act gave the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) unprecedented authority to regulate tobacco products to achieve the
complementary goals of increasing tobacco cessation and reducing tobacco
initiation.14 In the Act, Congress took an important step towards the goal of
preventing youth smoking by prohibiting most cigarettes with flavorings,15
recognizing the evidence that flavorings are a tool for tobacco companies to
attract and addict younger generations of smokers.16
The FSPTCA’s effectiveness was undercut, however, by Congress’s decision
to exempt from the ban of potentially the most damaging flavoring of all:
menthol.17 Menthol is consumed by nearly half of all youth smokers,18 making
it far and away more pervasive than any of the flavorings banned by Congress.19
There is no scientific reason to distinguish it from other flavorings.20 It is no
13. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). The Act
provided substantial oversight over tobacco products to the federal government, which would seem
well suited to the task of limiting menthol. See id.
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)(1) (2012); Nick Dantonio, Vape Away: Why A Minimalist
Regulatory Structure Is the Best Option for FDA E-Cigarette Regulation, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1319,
1348 n.173 (2014) (“Congress has now taken the unprecedented step of granting FDA jurisdiction
over [tobacco] products.”) (quoting Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 680
F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) aff’d sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 627 F.3d
891 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012).
16. Brian A. King et al., Flavored-Little-Cigar and Flavored-Cigarette Use Among U.S.
Middle and High School Students, 54 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 40, 45 (2014).
17. Robert J. Baehr, A New Wave of Paternalistic Tobacco Regulation, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1663, 1686 (2010) (“[W]orse still is the deadliness of the exemption. While not much thorough
research has been conducted outside of the tobacco industry, studies have demonstrated higher
nicotine dependence and lower quit rates among smokers of menthol cigarettes.”); Paul A. Diller,
Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1219, 1234 n.80 (2014) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 387g (2012)) (banning “artificial” and “natural
flavor” additives, except for menthol); see also Paul Smalera, Cool, Refreshing Legislation for
Philip Morris, THE BIG MONEY (June 8, 2009), http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/judgments/
2009/06/08/cool-refreshing-legislation-philip-morris (identifying that in the United States,
“[m]enthols account[] for a quarter of the roughly 370 billion cigarettes smoked domestically in
2006 and are more popular here than anywhere else in the world”).
18. NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, USE OF MENTHOL CIGARETTES 2‒3
(2009), http://archive.samhsa.gov/data/2k9/134/134MentholCigarettes.htm.
19. See Baehr, supra note 17, at 1686 (“Young smokers have a distinct preference for it, far
outstripping their preferences for other tobacco flavors.”); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,
Earmarking Earmarking, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 266 (2012) (“Public health advocates have
roundly criticized the menthol exemption.”) (referencing Stephanie Saul, Opposition
to Menthol Cigarettes Grows, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at C1 (noting opposition
to menthol exemption by seven former Secretaries of Health and Human Services)).
20. See Robert L. Rabin, Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related
Disease, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 507, 532 n.106 (2014) (“While there is no scientific
evidence of greater health risks associated with menthol, it is considered a gateway to youth
smoking and an impediment to quitting.”); see also Baehr, supra note 17, 1685‒86 (noting the
difficulty in “ignor[ing] anecdotal evidence that Congress drafted this menthol exception expressly

952

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:949

less attractive to youth than the flavorings prohibited by the Act21 and, in fact,
has additional drug-like properties that may impact addiction and cessation
among youth and adults alike.22
Exempting menthol from the flavor ban was a purely political decision. A
majority of African American smokers prefer menthol-flavored cigarettes,23 and
any measure regulating menthol was seen by Congress as politically charged.24
Instead of acting, Congress chose to pass the perceived “hot potato” to the FDA,
delegating to the federal agency the controversial decision as to whether menthol
should continue to receive favorable treatment or should be treated consistently
with other flavorings.25 More than five years and two exhaustive studies later,
the FDA continues to ponder this question.26
FDA inaction on tobacco control is not unique to menthol, and it does not
seem likely that the agency will adopt any regulations on menthol in the near
future.27 Fortunately, in the absence of decisive federal tobacco regulation, state
and local governments have stepped forward, regulating in creative ways with
varying degrees of success.28 Indeed, some state and local jurisdictions have
already begun or are considering29 regulating menthol tobacco products.30
for Philip Morris,” and for Marlboro, whose “menthol brand constituted more than five percent of
the total domestic cigarette market”).
21. See Baehr, supra note 17, at 1686.
22. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 24, 148‒49.
23. Id. at 42.
24. See Rabin, supra note 20, at 532 n.106; Stephanie Saul, Black Caucus Split on a Tobacco
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at C1.
25. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012).
26. See infra Part I.
27. See generally Mark Gottlieb, Overcautious FDA Has Lost Its Way, 23 TOBACCO
CONTROL 187 (2014).
28. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 17-706(a) (2010) (prohibiting the sale of tobacco to
anyone under the age of twenty-one); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731
F.3d 71, 74‒75 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding a Providence, Rhode Island, ordinance restricting sale
of flavored non-cigarette tobacco products and prohibiting tobacco coupon redemption against a
challenge based on preemption by the Labeling Act); 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. New York
City Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174, 180‒82, 185‒86 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down a New York City
ordinance requiring graphic warnings depicting dangers of smoking to be posted at point of sale on
the grounds that it was preempted by the Labeling Act); Laurel E. Curry, The Haverstraw
Experience: The First Tobacco Product Display Ban in the United States, 104 AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH e9, e9, e11‒e12 (2014) (describing how a Haverstraw, New York ordinance prohibiting
the display of tobacco products was repealed in the face of a lawsuit by convenience store interests
and big tobacco companies); Sean P. Murphy, Westminster Drops Proposal to Ban Tobacco Sales,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/11/19/westminster-dropsproposal-ban-tobacco-sales/iUqa8BceSI1wO4rFtpqkUL/story.html (recounting a proposed
ordinance to ban all tobacco sales in Westminster, Massachusetts, withdrawn after public outcry).
29. See, e.g., H.B. 1522, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2014) (prohibiting, if enacted, the sale of mentholflavored cigarettes).
30. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-64-180(b) (2013) (enacted) (restricting the sale
of tobacco products with any flavor, including menthol, near schools).
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Consequently, state and local regulation of menthol-flavored tobacco products
may well represent an important part of future tobacco control efforts.
Part I of this Article begins by illustrating why the use of menthol in tobacco
products poses such a serious risk to public health. Part II then describes actions
the federal government has taken—or, more accurately, failed to take—to
regulate menthol. As a consequence of the relative dearth of federal action, and
the leadership role state and local jurisdictions are undertaking, the bulk of this
Article, in Part III, is dedicated to surveying state and local actions taken on
menthol, describing additional actions state and local governments could take to
address the problem, and investigating whether state and local governments
actually have the authority to take these actions, concluding that they likely do.
Finally, this Article concludes with an analysis of the policy merits of each
option, and deduces from this analysis that the most effective way for a state or
local government to address the public health problem of menthol tobacco
products is through a sales restriction on the products.
I. THE PROBLEM OF MENTHOL
Before describing why menthol tobacco products pose a risk to public health,
it is important to define what constitutes a menthol tobacco product. Menthol is
a compound used in many consumer and medicinal products that has cooling
and analgesic properties.31 Menthol is present in many cigarettes, even those
not marketed specifically as menthol cigarettes.32 Federal law has yet to
establish a threshold, delineating an explicit concentration of menthol above
which a nonmenthol cigarette becomes a menthol cigarette.33 Similarly, the
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC), authorized by
Congress to study the impact of menthol in cigarettes on public health,34 failed
to adopt “a quantitative definition for a menthol cigarette, but instead relie[d] on
the brand designation,” noting that “[t]hose cigarettes marketed as menthol have
sufficient menthol content for menthol to become a ‘characterizing flavor.’”35
This Article will use the terms “menthol cigarette” and “menthol tobacco
product” consistent with the TPSAC definition. That is, a tobacco product will
be considered menthol if it has a level of menthol sufficient to rise to the level
of a characterizing flavor.
It is undisputed that menthol tobacco products pose a serious risk to public
health, even beyond the risk already present in nonmenthol tobacco products.
Two exhaustive studies have examined the existing data and publications on

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
Id. at 2.
See 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012).
Id.
TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
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menthol, and both concluded that the presence of menthol tobacco products in
the marketplace poses a risk to public health.36
The first study, approved by the TPSAC in July 2011, concluded that the
“[r]emoval of menthol cigarettes from the marketplace would benefit public
health in the United States.”37 Specifically, the TPSAC found that:
[Menthol’s] pharmacological actions reduce the harshness of smoke
and the irritation from nicotine, and may increase the likelihood of
nicotine addiction in adolescents and young adults who experiment
with smoking. Furthermore, the distinct sensory characteristics of
menthol may enhance the addictiveness of menthol cigarettes, which
appears to be the case among youth. TPSAC has found that the
availability of menthol cigarettes has an adverse impact on public
health by increasing the numbers of smokers with resulting premature
death and avoidable morbidity.38
The TPSAC also concluded that minority youth smoke menthol cigarettes at
alarming and disproportionate rates, finding that “[m]ore than 80 percent of
adolescent African American smokers and more than half of adolescent Hispanic
smokers use menthol cigarettes.”39 Use of menthol products is also prevalent
among non-minority youth, unemployed persons, and individuals making less
than $10,000 per year.40
In July 2013, the FDA published its own exhaustive report on menthol
entitled, “Preliminary Scientific Evaluation of the Possible Public Health Effects
of Menthol Versus Nonmenthol Cigarettes.”41 Although the report notes that
“there is little evidence to suggest that menthol cigarettes are more or less toxic
or contribute to more disease risk to the user than nonmenthol cigarettes,” it still
reaches the conclusion that it is likely “that menthol cigarettes pose a public
health risk above that seen with nonmenthol cigarettes” because menthol
tobacco products are associated with an increased rate of smoking initiation by
youth, possessing greater addiction potential than nonmenthol products, and
making quit attempts less successful.42
Other studies have noted the same disparate use patterns of menthol. A
National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that menthol cigarettes are used
at disproportionately higher rates by racial and ethnic minority smokers,
including African Americans (82.6%), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islanders
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra text accompanying notes 37‒42.
TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 225.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE
PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS OF MENTHOL VERSUS NONMENTHOL CIGARETTES 1 (2013), http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PeerReviewofScientificInformationand
Assessments/UCM361598.pdf [hereinafter FDA MENTHOL REPORT].
42. Id. at 6.
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(53.2%), Hispanics or Latinos (32.3%), and Asian Americans (31.2%), in
contrast to white smokers (23.8%).43 Also, approximately seventy-one percent
of all young LGBT smokers use menthol cigarettes,44 and nearly half of all teen
smokers use menthol tobacco products.45 In addition, a convincing body of
evidence has shown tobacco-related health disparities are exacerbated by
targeted marketing strategies in minority areas,46 a practice previously linked to
menthol tobacco products.47
Considering the relative consensus among the scientific community that
menthol tobacco products particularly pose a serious public health problem, one
would expect the federal government to take prompt action on this crisis.
Unfortunately, the federal government has remained relatively inactive,
frustrating many of those in the public health community.
II. FEDERAL INACTION ON MENTHOL
Any discussion of federal regulation of menthol tobacco products must begin
with analyzing the FSPTCA.48 This landmark legislation entrusted to, for the
first time, the FDA the authority to adopt tobacco product standards aimed at
improving public health.49 The FDA, in determining whether a proposed
tobacco product standard will improve public health, must consider three things:
first, “the risks and benefits to the population as a whole”; second, “the increased
or decreased likelihood that existing users will stop using such products”; and
lastly, “the increased or decreased likelihood that [non-users of tobacco] will
start using such products.”50
One other provision of the FSPTCA warrants brief mention. Section 105 of
the Act required the FDA to “develop and publish an action plan to enforce
restrictions . . . on promotion and advertising of menthol and other cigarettes to

43. NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, supra note 18, at 5.
44. NATIONAL YOUTH ADVOCACY COALITION, COMING OUT ABOUT SMOKING: A REPORT
FROM THE NATIONAL LGBTQ YOUNG ADULT TOBACCO PROJECT (2010), http://lgbttobacco.org/
files/Coming_Out_About_Smoking_NYAC.pdf.
45. CASACOLUMBIA, TIME TO BAN MENTHOL 6‒7 (2014), http://www.casacolumbia.org/
addiction-research/reports/time-to-ban-menthol-report-2014.
46. Sarah Moreland-Russell et al., Disparities and Menthol Marketing: Additional Evidence
in Support of Point of Sale Policies, 10 INT. J. ENVIRON. RES. PUB. HEALTH 4571, 4572, 4580
(2013).
47. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater
Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 123‒24 (2002)
(noting that a “cigarette company was forced to withdraw its menthol cigarette, ‘Uptown,’ because
the product was deliberately targeted at African-American consumers”); CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO COMPANY MARKETING TO AFRICAN AMERICANS 1, 3‒4 (2015),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0208.pdf.
48. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(3)(A) (2012).
50. Id. § 387g(a)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
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youth.”51 The FDA solicited public comment and issued an “Enforcement
Action Plan for Promotion and Advertising Restrictions” in October 2010.52 The
Action Plan includes provisions related to market surveillance of menthol
cigarettes, but contained no restrictions on menthol that did not already apply to
all cigarettes.53
Although the FSPTCA provided the FDA wide discretion in adopting tobacco
product standards, some requirements were created directly by Congress. For
example, in recognition of the appeal flavorings (such as candy, fruit, and
alcohol) have for children and young adults,54 the FSPTCA prohibited any
cigarette from containing a characterizing flavor.55 Importantly, the prohibition
exempted tobacco and menthol flavors, and did not apply to non-cigarette
tobacco products.56
The political compromise exempting menthol generally was not well
received.57 The New York Times wrote:
With menthol brands making up about 28 percent of the $70 billion
American cigarette market, the exemption was seen as a necessary
compromise to win broad backing for the legislation. But menthol has
become a politically charged subject in Washington because an
estimated 75 percent of black smokers choose mentholated brands.58
The African American Tobacco Prevention Network, arguing that the
exemption was discriminatory, claimed that the menthol exemption “sends a
message that African American youngsters are valued less than white
youngsters.”59 In contrast, others argued, albeit weakly, that making such
arguments was equivalent to playing a “race card.”60 In a disturbing twist, the
Lorillard Tobacco Company, the largest producer of menthol cigarettes,61
cynically tried to co-opt African American history in support of continued
menthol exemption, arguing that “the history of African Americans in this
country has been one of fighting against paternalistic limitations and for

51. 21 U.S.C. § 387f-1(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
52. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ENFORCEMENT ACTION PLAN FOR PROMOTION AND
ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS 1‒5 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM227882.pdf.
53. Id. at 11‒14.
54. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 16, at 44‒45.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Saul, supra note 24; Cuéllar, supra note 19, at 266.
58. Saul, supra note 24.
59. Andrew Cheyne et al., The Debate on Regulating Menthol Cigarettes: Closing a
Dangerous Loophole vs Freedom of Choice, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e54, e57 (2014).
60. Id.
61. See Andrew Zajac, Lorillard Wins Ruling on Tobacco Panel Conflicts, BLOOMBERG (July
22, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-21/lorillard-wins-rulingon-tobacco-panel-conflicts.
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freedoms.”62 Some, including the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
have countered this inane argument by correctly mentioning that addiction to a
substance, such as nicotine, countervails freedom.63
Acknowledging the public health problems left unaddressed by the menthol
exemption, the FSPTCA directed the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory
Committee (TPSAC) to study “the impact of the use of menthol in cigarettes on
the public health, including such use among children, African-Americans,
Hispanics, and other racial and ethnic minorities.”64 In July 2011, the TPSAC
ireached the conclusion that the removal of menthol cigarettes from the
marketplace would benefit public health.65
Rather than act promptly, the FDA instead announced that it would conduct
“a preliminary independent scientific evaluation of existing data and research on
menthol cigarettes.”66 Although this may seem like a typical example of the
intractable inertia of federal bureaucracies, the FDA’s decision to conduct an
additional review on menthol irrespective of the TPSAC report was more likely
a canny decision to mitigate a potential adverse ruling following a lawsuit filed
by two of the largest tobacco companies against the FDA disputing the TPSAC’s
determinations. Some even suggest that the FDA commissioned the second
report on menthol to “ensure that the evidence base for action was not clouded
by the potential impact” of this lawsuit.67
This lawsuit, challenging the composition of the TPSAC and arguing that
some of the committee members had conflicts of interest, commenced in
February 2011.68 In July 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia agreed with the tobacco companies’ allegation, concluding that the
TPSAC’s “findings and recommendations, including reports such as the
Menthol Report, are, at a minimum, suspect, and, at worst, untrustworthy.”69
Unfortunately, the FDA delayed the release of its independent menthol report
and continued to dawdle on the topic of menthol. Although the peer review for
the independent report was completed in early 2012, the report was not issued
until July 2013,70 leading some to speculate that the delay was “to ensure that
there would not be a proposed menthol rule issued before the 2012 Presidential
election.”71
62. Cheyne et al., supra note 59, at e58.
63. Id. at e57.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012).
65. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 225.
66. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Tobacco Products: Menthol Cigarettes, http://www.fda.
gov/TobaccoProducts/PublicHealthScienceResearch/Menthol/default.htm (last visited July 14,
2015).
67. Gottlieb, supra note 27, at 187.
68. Lorillard, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 56 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2014).
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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The independent report reached conclusions similar to those of the TPSAC
report, finding that menthol is associated with youth smoking initiation, greater
addiction, and poses a public health risk surpassing that of nonmenthol
cigarettes.72 Again, rather than taking prompt action, the FDA issued a
nonbinding advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and took public
comments.73 The comment period closed in November 2013, and despite calls
on the agency to ban menthol, the FDA has been silent on the topic of menthol
since then.74
Not only is the congressional menthol exemption detrimental to the public
welfare, but its inherent inconsistency with respect to the restriction of other
cigarette flavorings, such as clove cigarettes, has also led to potential financial
repercussions resulting from international disputes.75 After the FSPTCA flavor
ban prohibited the importation of clove cigarettes, Indonesia—the largest
exporter of clove cigarettes—successfully argued before the World Trade
Organization (WTO) that the flavor ban was discriminatory because it applied
to clove cigarettes while exempting menthol.76 A WTO panel sided with
Indonesia, although the United States and Indonesia subsequently settled the
dispute.77
Given that the FDA appears to have little appetite for meaningful action
regarding the regulation of menthol, it may be up to other levels of government
to address this problem. Fortunately, some state and local jurisdictions have
adopted or introduced policy interventions addressing menthol.78
III. STATE AND LOCAL OPTIONS
State and local governments are often viewed as a “laboratory” for innovative
policy,79 and certainly seem like the natural governmental entities capable of
tackling such a serious public health problem in the face of federal foot-

72. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6.
73. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol in
Cigarettes (July 23, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm361966.htm.
74. See Letter from Twenty-Seven Attorneys General to Division of Dockets Management
Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 8, 2013), http://ago.vermont.gov/assets/files/Consumer/
Tobacco/Menthol%20Letter.pdf.
75. Vicki Needham, US, Indonesia Settle Fight Over Clove Cigarettes, THE HILL (Oct. 3,
2014), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/219755-us-indonesia-settle-clove-cigarette-dispute.
76. Id. (noting that the reviewing WTO Panel found that clove and menthol cigarettes are
“like products” under controlling trade agreements “based in part on its factual findings that both
types of cigarettes are flavoured and appeal to youth”).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-64-180(b)(2013) (enacted) (restricting the sale
of tobacco products with any flavor, including menthol, near schools); H.B. 1522, 27th Leg. (Haw.
2014) (prohibiting, if enacted, the sale of menthol flavored cigarettes).
79. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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dragging.80 The tobacco control movement—a movement dedicated to the
curtailment of tobacco products through the employment of public policy tactics
founded in compelling empirical data81—can find several advantages in
employing public policy options at the state or local level given the potentially
lesser influence of political lobbying at these levels, compared with the federal
level.82
The tobacco control movement has relied on several different policy options
to address the general problem of tobacco-related death and disease.83 These
policies include sales prohibitions and restrictions, tax policies, other pricerelated policies, age-of-sale regulations, disclosure requirements, and marketing
restrictions. Each of these options raises complicated legal issues as well as
policy arguments for and against them, which this section evaluates. The
question becomes, however, whether these policy options could be used to
address the specific tobacco control problem of menthol.
A. Sales Prohibition
Federal law prohibits the presence of characterizing flavors in cigarettes, yet
excludes menthol and non-cigarette tobacco products from this prohibition.84
The most straightforward approach to addressing the problem of menthol would
be to simply label it as a characterizing flavor in tobacco products, thereby
removing it from the marketplace—an approach utilized in other countries, such
as Brazil.85 Unfortunately, state and local governments cannot simply extend
this prohibition to menthol tobacco products. In adopting this section of the

80. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905) (affirming authority of the
legislature “to care for the public health and the public safety when endangered by epidemics of
disease”).
81. Randolph Kline et. al., Beyond Advertising Controls, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603, 603‒04
(2006).
82. Leslie Zellers & Ian McLaughlin, State and Local Policy as a Tool to Complement and
Supplement the FDA Law, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 117‒19 (2010).
83. See, e.g., FOREWORD, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. v‒vi (May 21, 2003), http://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/ (listing policy
options, including, but not limited to, price and tax measures, education and public awareness, and
sales to minors); see also THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, supra note 1, at 788‒800
(discussing anti-smoking policies such as taxation, smoke-free and tobacco-free legislation,
regulations on youth access, advertising bans and restrictions, and tobacco product litigation).
84. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012).
85. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, REGULATING MENTHOL TOBACCO
PRODUCTS, 2 (March 23, 2012), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclcguide-reg-menthol-tips-tools-2015.pdf. The European Union intends to adopt similar measures in
2016. Id.; Wiktor Sarzy, Poland to Challenge EU Ban on Menthol Cigarettes, BUS. INSIDER (July
21, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-poland-to-challenge-eu-ban-on-menthol-cigarettes2014‒21; contra Alberta Exempting Menthol Cigarettes Under Flavoured Tobacco Ban, CBC
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/alberta-exempting-mentholcigarettes-under-flavoured-tobacco-ban-1.2834374.
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FSPTCA, Congress considered the flavor restriction to be a “tobacco product
standard,” a regulation left in the exclusive domain of the federal government.86
Although Congress preempted state and local adoption of tobacco product
standards, it granted state and local governments’ wide authority to regulate the
sale and distribution of tobacco products.87 Thus, a state or local government
could consider prohibiting the sale of menthol tobacco products. In fact, one
government has considered doing this. In the Hawaii legislature, bills were
proposed that would have prohibited the sale of tobacco products containing any
characterizing flavor, including menthol, with no exemptions for specific
retailers.88 However, these bills were not enacted into law. Accordingly, legal
analysis is required to predict whether a court would have upheld such a
regulation on menthol had the bill been passed into law.
The answer to this question requires a detailed discussion of the FSPTCA’s
three complementary provisions that affect local authority to regulate tobacco
products. A preservation clause grants state, local, and tribal governments the
authority to adopt a range of tobacco control regulations that are more stringent
than federal law.89 A provision within the preservation clause preserves the right
of state and local governments to adopt regulations “relating to or prohibiting
the sale [or] distribution . . . of tobacco products.”90 And, as mentioned
previously, a preemption clause removes the ability of state and local
governments to adopt “tobacco product standards.”91 However, the savings
clause reiterates that the preemption clause “does not apply to requirements
relating to the sale [or] distribution” of “tobacco products.”92 Notably, the
savings clause excludes the word “prohibiting” that appears in the preservation
clause.
These provisions of the FSPTCA have not been widely litigated. To the extent
they have, however, court decisions have generally favored the authority of state
and local governments. The most relevant litigation involves ordinances from
New York City93 and Providence, Rhode Island,94 both of which restricted the
sale of non-cigarette tobacco products containing characterizing flavors—with

86. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(A) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012) (including ban on
flavored tobacco products under “tobacco product standards”).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(B) (2012).
88. H.B. 1522, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2014) (prohibiting, if enacted, menthol cigarettes), S.B. 2222,
27th Leg. (Haw. 2014) (prohibiting, if enacted, all flavored tobacco products).
89. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1) (2012).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. § 387p(a)(2)(A).
92. Id. § 387p(a)(2)(B).
93. See U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 431‒32 (2d
Cir. 2013).
94. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir.
2013).
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the exception of menthol, mint, and wintergreen flavors.95 Both ordinances also
contained limited exemptions for certain retailers. For example, Providence
exempted “smoking bars,”96 while New York City exempted “tobacco bars,” of
which there were only eight and none sold flavored smokeless tobacco.97
In both cases, tobacco manufacturers and retailers argued that the ordinances
were tobacco product standards masquerading as sales restrictions.98 In both
cases, federal district and circuit courts disagreed. The First Circuit,
emphasizing the exemption for smoking bars—which rendered the ordinance
“not a blanket prohibition”—held that the Providence ordinance fell within the
FSPTCA’s savings clause as a regulation relating to the sale of tobacco
products.99 The Second Circuit held that the New York City ordinance was not
preempted as a tobacco product standard, but was an acceptable sales regulation,
explaining that a product standard is a regulation that would “require
manufacturers to alter the construction, components, ingredients, additives,
constituents, and properties of their products.”100 The court reasoned that the
New York City ordinance was not a product standard because the city was
concerned only with “whether final tobacco products are ultimately
characterized by—or marketed as having—a flavor.”101
While the Second Circuit’s primary holding was that the New York City
ordinance did not rise to the level of a product standard, the court stated that
even if the New York City ordinance were a tobacco product standard, it would
fall within the FSPTCA’s savings clause as a requirement related to the sale of
tobacco products.102 The court adopted a broad reading of the savings clause,
noting that Congress decided to “preserve for the states a robust role in
regulating, and even banning, sales of tobacco products.”103 The court felt that
the ordinance was limited in scope because it regulated “a niche product,” that
is, flavored non-cigarette tobacco products, and “not a broad category of
products such as cigarettes or smokeless tobacco.”104 As further proof of the
ordinance’s limited scope, the Second Circuit noted the exemption for tobacco
bars.105

95. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 431‒32; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets,
731 F.3d at 74 n.2, 76 n.5.
96. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 74.
97. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 431‒32.
98. Id. at 434; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 82.
99. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, 731 F.3d at 82.
100. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 434 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(4)(B)
(2012)) (internal quotations omitted).
101. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 435.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 436 n.3.
105. Id. at 432.
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Although a state or local government could not adopt a requirement
prohibiting the manufacturing of a tobacco product with a menthol flavoring,
these cases suggest that a state or local prohibition on the sale of menthol
tobacco products might survive judicial scrutiny. Still, some factors do suggest
that courts might look less favorably on a state or local prohibition on the sale
of menthol tobacco products than they did on the New York City or Providence
ordinances.
First, in finding that the New York City ordinance was a sales regulation
within the FSPTCA’s savings clause, the Second Circuit considered it relevant
that the ordinance regulated merely a “niche product.”106 Because one-third of
U.S. smokers smoke menthol cigarettes,107 it would be more challenging to
categorize them as a niche product. However, it might not be impossible. The
Second Circuit distinguished “niche product[s],” like flavored non-cigarette
tobacco products, from “a broad category of products such as cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco,” thereby creating a spectrum of niche-ness.108 On this
spectrum, menthol cigarettes would fall somewhere between flavored noncigarette tobacco products and all cigarettes. Considering two-thirds of smokers
do not smoke menthol cigarettes, menthol is likely closer to the former.109
Second, a sales prohibition can be distinguished from the New York City and
Providence ordinances, and would require a court to consider questions that
neither the First nor Second Circuits directly addressed. Most obviously, the
New York City and Providence ordinances exempt tobacco bars and smoking
bars respectively,110 while a sales prohibition would have no such exemption.
Both circuits discussed the exemptions.111 However, they did not reach the
question of whether such an exemption is necessary in order for the ordinance
to fall within the savings clause. There is some merit to this argument because
the savings clause uses different language than the preservation clause. The
preservation clause discusses measures “relating to or prohibiting the sale . . . of
tobacco products,”112 while the savings clause merely references regulations
“relating to the sale . . . of[] tobacco products.”113 However, this does not mean
that a state or local sales prohibition would necessarily be preempted. When
used with “to,” “relate” simply means “to have connection, relation, or
106. Id. at 436.
107. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 41.
108. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 436.
109. See TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 41.
110. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 431; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc.
v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 2013).
111. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., 708 F.3d at 436 n.3; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets,
731 F.3d at 82; see also Order at 2, Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’n v. City of Chicago, No. 14
C 7536 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2014) (“If Chicago were to ban the sale of menthol-flavored tobacco
products outright, [plaintiff gas stations] might have a colorable argument that the city was
imposing a requirement that ran afoul of the Act’s preemption term.”).
112. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
113. Id. § 387p(a)(2).
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reference.”114 A sales prohibition would certainly be connected or related to the
sale of tobacco products. Still, it would likely be up to a court to determine the
significance, if any, with respect to the absence of the word “prohibiting” from
the savings clause.
Finally, the FSPTCA contains several provisions that are specific to menthol
cigarettes that appear to support the argument that it is the federal government,
not state and local governments, that should be regulating these products. First,
as noted previously, the FSPTCA charged TPSAC with studying menthol
cigarettes.115 However, Congress included a rule of construction that the
obligation charged to the TPSAC did not limit the FDA’s “authority to take
action under this section or other sections of this chapter applicable to
menthol.”116 Arguably, this language suggests that Congress did not intend for
menthol cigarettes to be treated any differently than other tobacco products
under other sections of the FSPTCA. Moreover, legislative history suggests that
the TPSAC charge was motivated by concern that a nationwide menthol ban
would lead to a black market in menthol cigarettes, and a sudden demand for
cessation services that quitlines could not absorb.117 A state or local sales
prohibition would not raise those concerns to the same extent.
Additionally, the FSPTCA singles out cigarettes in ways that may raise
concerns regarding a state or local regulation of menthol cigarettes. Most
notably, as previously discussed, the law prohibits cigarettes from containing a
characterizing flavor, with the exception of tobacco and menthol flavors.118 This
provision contains a rule of construction similar to the provision charging
TPSAC with studying menthol, stating that the FDA retains authority to adopt
regulations related “to menthol or any artificial or natural flavor, herb, or spice
not specified in this subparagraph.”119 Again, this arguably suggests that
Congress did not intend for the regulation of menthol tobacco products to be
treated differently at the state and local level than other tobacco products
pursuant to other sections of the FSPTCA. Additional provisions of the
FSPTCA regulate cigarettes,120 but none suggest that state and local authority
should be diminished beyond what is in the preemption clause.
These legal authorities suggest that a court may very well uphold a state or
local prohibition on the sale of menthol tobacco products, and such a prohibition
could be modeled off of the New York City and Providence ordinances that
114. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1472 (4th ed.)
(2000).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012).
116. Id. § 387g(e)(3).
117. H.R. Rep. No. 111-58, pt. 1, at 38 (2009).
118. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Id. § 387g(d)(3)(A) (prohibiting the FDA from banning all cigarettes); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333(d) (2012) (requiring the FDA to promulgate regulations requiring the placement of graphic
warnings depicting adverse health effects of smoking on cigarette packaging).
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restrict the sale of flavored non-cigarette tobacco products.121 However, some
changes should be considered. First, the exemption for menthol, mint, and
wintergreen flavors should be eliminated. Although smokeless tobacco products
with a menthol flavoring do not appear to be as widely used as menthol
cigarettes, there does not appear to be a sound public health basis for exempting
these flavorings. It has been conclusively demonstrated that menthol as a
flavoring appeals to youth;122 mint and wintergreen flavorings are presumably
no less appealing. Second, to constitute a true sales prohibition, no retailer
should be exempt from an ordinance the way tobacco bars and smoking bars
were exempted in New York City and Providence, respectively. Finally, the
ordinance should have a provision including menthol cigarettes within the sales
prohibition. This provision would be the most controversial because of the
number of menthol smokers, but, for the same reason, it would make the most
substantive improvement in public health. In order to decrease the risk of
preemptive conflict with the FSPTCA’s prohibition on flavored cigarettes, this
prohibition ought to be a separate section from the provisions related to noncigarette tobacco products and should make it explicitly clear that, in the case of
cigarettes, the ordinance is regulating menthol. This provision could also
include a “sunset clause,” stating that the provision would cease to be in effect
if and when the FDA added menthol to the list of prohibited flavors for
cigarettes. Finally, the ordinance should include a severability clause so that it
remains in effect if any part of it gets struck down.
Still, would such an ordinance be sound from a policy standpoint, and would
it be practical? Several arguments support a menthol sales ban. First, it is a
logical extension of the FSPTCA’s prohibition on flavored cigarettes.123 It
would effectuate the conclusions of the TPSAC and FDA reports that removing
menthol from the marketplace would benefit public health.124 It would remove
a common starter product, making it less likely that youth would begin
smoking.125 It would also help with smoking cessation among menthol
smokers,126 which could help reduce tobacco-related disparities among
classified diversity groups. Moreover, because such a policy would not have
any exemptions, it would presumably be more effective in reaching these
objectives compared to policies that exempted certain retailers or tobacco
products.
Some arguments, however, cut the other way. Legislative history shows that
Congress exempted menthol cigarettes from the flavor ban because it was
concerned about a potential black market for menthol cigarettes and a dramatic
121. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 17-715 (2014); CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF
PROVIDENCE § 14-309 (2012), https://www.providenceri.com/efile/2036.
122. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 3.
123. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A).
124. TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 225; FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6.
125. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 5.
126. Pearson, supra note 12, at e111.
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increase in the need for cessation services.127 The threat of a black market is
often used by the tobacco industry to argue against any meaningful tobacco
control measure and is likely a red herring.128 The need for increased cessation
services is a more serious concern, but it can certainly be addressed within the
existing tobacco cessation infrastructure. Standard tobacco control measures,
such as tobacco tax increases129 or smoke-free laws,130 invariably lead to an
increase in cessation attempts, but do not seem to overwhelm the system.
Indeed, residents of every U.S. state have access to a tobacco quitline.131
Political challenges and the risk of litigation present more serious
impediments to adopting a state or local menthol sales prohibition. As the
congressional experience shows,132 it would be politically challenging to adopt
a state or local menthol sales prohibition. The tobacco industry has proven adept
at using arguments related to tobacco smuggling, racial bias, and personal liberty
to thwart effective menthol regulations.133 These arguments are generally
specious,134 but can be effective with policymakers.135
Further, as noted earlier, the First and Second Circuits relied in part on the
presence of exemptions for smoking bars and tobacco bars, respectively, in
finding that the cities’ ordinances fell within the FSPTCA’s savings clause.136
It is by no means certain that a court would not uphold an ordinance without
127. H.R. Rep. No. 111-58, pt. 1, at 38 (2009).
128. See David E. Rosenbaum, Smoking Foes Battle the Industry’s Specter of Smuggling, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1998, at A28 (“Senator John H. Chafee, Republican of Rhode Island, . . .
characterizes the black-market argument as a ‘red herring.’”); Letter from twenty-seven Attorneys
General, supra note 74, at 3 (“The specter of a black market is often raised to oppose regulation or
taxes, but the threat of the emergence of a black market in menthol cigarettes should not be
permitted to override the protection of public health. Although contraband cigarettes are a serious
problem, there are numerous law enforcement tools that can be used to combat production or
importation of unlawful tobacco products.”); see also BENJAMIN C. ALAMAR ET AL., CIGARETTE
SMUGGLING IN CALIFORNIA: FACT AND FICTION, CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RESEARCH &
EDUC. 19‒20 (2003), http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4fv0b2sz#page-1 (finding that tax
increases on cigarettes increase smuggling only marginally).
129. See Jie-Min Lee, Effect of a Large Increase in Cigarette Tax on Cigarette Consumption:
An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Sectional Survey Data, 122 PUB. HEALTH 1061, 1066 (2008).
130. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 16 (2000) (finding that support for “clean indoor air restrictions” is “high”
because smoke-free “environments have been shown to decrease daily tobacco consumption and to
increase smoking cessation among smokers”).
131. See NORTH AMERICAN QUITLINE CONSORTIUM, WHAT IS A QUITLINE, http://www.
naquitline.org/?page=whatisquitline (last visited July 15, 2015).
132. See, e.g., Saul, supra note 24.
133. See generally Cheyne et al., supra note 59, at e56‒e58.
134. See generally ALAMAR ET AL., supra note 128.
135. See Cheyne et al., supra note 59, at e56 (quoting U.S. Representative John Dingell
defending the menthol exemption and explaining that “[i]n a perfect world, we’d ban all cigarettes
. . . [b]ut the hard fact is that there are a lot of jobs depending on this”).
136. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 82 (1st Cir.
2013); U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 436 (2d Cir. 2013).
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such an exemption, but it is not guaranteed. For that reason, a state or local sales
restriction (i.e., not a prohibition) on menthol tobacco products will now be
evaluated.
B. Sales Restrictions
The most meaningful state or local menthol policy taken to date is a sales
restriction enacted in Chicago. In late 2013, the city council adopted an
ordinance prohibiting the sale of any tobacco product containing any
characterizing flavor—including menthol—by tobacco retailers located within
five hundred feet of any school property line.137 At the time the ordinance was
considered, 351 out of 2,986 tobacco retailers—or about 11.7%—were located
within 500 feet of a school zone.138 The ordinance exempted “retail tobacco
stores” that derive at least eighty percent of sales from tobacco and related
products.139 Less than five percent of retail stores within the City of Chicago
met the definition of “retail tobacco stores.”140
Determining whether the Chicago sales restriction ordinance would be
preempted as an invalid tobacco product standard requires legal analysis similar
to that applied to a sales prohibition ordinance. A sales restriction, compared to
a sales prohibition, would seem to be an even clearer example of a restriction
that “relat[es] to the sale [of] tobacco products”141 permitted under the
FSPTCA’s savings clause because it exempts both “retail tobacco stores” and
retailers located more than five hundred feet from a school.142 Indeed, an
association of gas stations recently challenged the Chicago ordinance in federal
district court,143 and preliminary decisions in this litigation suggest that the city
was acting within its authority.144 Therefore, it appears likely that a court would
uphold the ordinance.
One can imagine a broader sales restriction that still falls short of a
prohibition. For example, rather than limiting the scope of the ordinance to
within five hundred feet of schools, it could apply citywide or statewide, while
still including narrow exemptions for certain retailers. To ensure that the
137. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-64-180(b)(2013) (enacted).
138. Melissa Buenger, Licensed Tobacco Retailers Within 500 Feet of Public and Private
Schools by Chicago Ward (2013) (on file with author).
139. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 4-64-180(b), 7-32-010 (2013) (enacted).
140. Complaint at 5, Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No.
14CV7536, 2015 WL 4038743 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2014). The city of Berkeley, California, has
considered a similar ordinance. Ivy Kim, Berkeley City Council Explores Restriction of Flavored
Tobacco Sales Near Schools, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN (March 10, 2014), http://www.dailycal.
org/2014/03/10/berkeley-city-council-explores-restriction-flavored-tobacco-sales-near-schools/.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(B) (2012).
142. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-64-180(b) (2013) (enacted).
143. See generally Complaint, Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No.
14CV7536, 2015 WL 4038743 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2014).
144. Order at 2, Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’n v. City of Chicago, No. 14CV7536, 2015
WL 4038743 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2014).
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ordinance has a maximum public health benefit, any such exemption should be
drafted as narrowly as possible. Consequently, exemptions could be modeled
after the “tobacco bar” exemption in the New York City ordinance because only
eight retailers met the definition.145 The exemption for “retail tobacco stores”
in the Chicago ordinance also seems to be a potential model because less than
five percent of retail stores in Chicago meet this definition.146 Other laws define
tobacco retailers in ways that might also make useful models.147
Presumably, by limiting the ordinance’s scope to within five hundred feet of
schools, Chicago intended to address the appeal of flavored tobacco, especially
menthol, to youth. This is certainly a laudable goal, and the ordinance could be
an effective way of addressing this problem. However, menthol has also been
shown to make it more difficult for adult smokers to quit,148 a problem left
unaddressed by the geographically restricted Chicago ordinance. Given that
“88.25 percent of Chicago retailers can continue to sell menthol tobacco
products,” it appears that these products will still be readily available to adult
smokers.149 For that reason, a more comprehensive restriction would seem to be
desirable from a public health standpoint.
A statewide or citywide sales restriction with a limited exemption for adult
tobacco retailers would seem to be a stronger ordinance because it would
advance the complementary goals of preventing youth tobacco initiation while
encouraging adult cessation. While an exemption for adult tobacco retailers
would undercut the latter goal somewhat, if the exemption is drawn narrowly
enough, it would still help advance the goal by removing a tempting product—
i.e., menthol cigarettes—from locations adult smokers would frequent for
reasons unrelated to a tobacco habit, such as gas stations.
C. Tax Policy
Raising taxes on tobacco products has long been recognized as an effective
method to help encourage cessation and limit tobacco initiation by youth who
are especially price sensitive.150 It is certainly possible that a tax increase on
145. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2013).
146. See Complaint at 5, Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No.
14CV7536, 2015 WL 4038743 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2014).
147. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(c)(2)(ii) (2014) (exempting vending machines and selfservice displays that are monitored by the retailer from a requirement that tobacco sales be
conducted in face-to-face exchanges with retailers); Minn. Stat. § 144.4167, subd. 4 (2008)
(defining “tobacco products shop[s]” as a “retail establishment . . . that derives more than 90 percent
of its gross revenue from the sale of” tobacco and various tobacco products).
148. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6.
149. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, REGULATING MENTHOL TOBACCO
PRODUCTS 3 (2015), http://publichealthlawcenter.org//sites/default/files/resources/tclc-guide-regmenthol-tips-tools-2015.pdf.
150. See Jidong Huan & Frank J. Chaloupka, IV, The Impact of the 2009 Federal Tobacco
Excise Tax Increase on Youth Tobacco Use 24‒29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 18026, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18026.pdf.
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menthol tobacco products beyond the level applied to nonmenthol products
would constitute an impetus to quit the smoking of mentholated products and
potentially tobacco use altogether, and an additional deterrent to the initiation of
mentholated tobacco use.
There is a precedent for imposing price disparities among different tobacco
products. Certainly, the retail prices of different categories of tobacco products
are not consistent. This is in large part due to differential tax rates for products
like cigarettes that typically see higher tax rates than products, such as cigars
and smokeless tobacco, which typically have comparatively lower prices.151
Some have recommended taxing tobacco products according to toxicity,152 a
recommendation that is analogous to raising taxes on menthol tobacco products.
While the evidence does not suggest that menthol tobacco products cause more
direct physical harm to an individual than nonmenthol products, evidence does
suggest that menthol products increase the likelihood of tobacco initiation and
hinder cessation.153 Since both of these problems increase health care costs on
society and individual tobacco users, there is some logic to enacting a similar
method of leveling taxes.
The most powerful argument against a higher tax rate for menthol tobacco
products is that it would be regressive.154 Given that use rates for menthol
tobacco products are inversely related to an individual’s socioeconomic
status,155 a higher tax on menthol tobacco products would be felt most acutely
by addicted persons who are least able to absorb the cost, a reality acknowledged
during the Chicago ordinance campaign.156 Before recommending a sales
restriction on all flavored tobacco products, the Chicago Board of Health
considered several different policy options to address the problem of menthol.157
The Board opposed a higher tax on menthol tobacco products because it believed

151. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, THE BEST WAY TO TAX SMOKELESS
TOBACCO 1 (2013), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0282.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Zeller et al., supra note 7, at 329‒30.
153. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 5‒6.
154. See KAREN RICHARDSON, SMOKING, LOW INCOME AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES:
THEMATIC DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 12 (May 2001), http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_
86.pdf.
155. See TPSAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 48.
156. See Whet Moser, The Good and Bad of Sin Taxes’ Impact on Chicago’s Poor, CHI. (Nov.
7, 2013), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/November-2013/Chicagos-Sin-Taxes-Could-Have
-More-Impact-on-the-PoorBut-Could-Benefit-Them-More-As-Well/.
157. See generally CHICAGO BD. OF HEALTH, HEALTHY CHICAGO: TRANSFORMING THE
HEALTH OF OUR CITY, CURBING THE USE OF MENTHOL-FLAVORED CIGARETTES AND OTHER
FLAVORED TOBACCO PRODUCTS AMONG YOUTH: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND OTHER
STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL ACTION (2013), https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/
cdph/CDPH/MentholReport%20_Jan212014.pdf (discussing policies aimed at reducing access to
and use of menthol cigarettes such as limiting venues where menthol products can be sold, limiting
promotional offers, expanding cessation services, etc.)
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such a tax would “place a disproportionate burden on minority communities that
have already been the target of predatory marketing.”158
Even in the absence of arguments that a tax increase on menthol tobacco
products would be regressive, taxes are a perennially controversial policy option.
In the context of a jurisdiction with a large proportion of minority communities,
this is a valid concern. However, considering taxation is well within the purview
of state and local governments, and the FSPTCA’s preemption clause
specifically states that the law does not “limit or otherwise affect any State,
tribal, or local taxation of tobacco products,”159 coupled with the historically
effective impact increased taxation has upon smoking rates,160 a tax policy
targeting menthol tobacco products remains a viable policy option especially in
communities where youth tobacco initiation is a larger concern, such as a college
town. Still, it is worth examining whether other policy options dealing with
price could achieve some of the same goals.
D. Other Price-Related Policies
State and local jurisdictions have adopted several tobacco control regulations,
outside direct taxation, that affect the price of tobacco products. As one
example, the city of Providence, Rhode Island, adopted an ordinance that
prohibits retailers from accepting any coupons that reduce the price of tobacco
products in conjunction with restricting the sale of flavored non-cigarette
tobacco products.161 Second, some jurisdictions simply set a minimum price for
various tobacco products.162 Finally, some jurisdictions address price by setting
a minimum pack size for various tobacco products.163
The legality of these non-tax price regulations is not as clear cut as tax laws
because the preservation clause of the FSPTCA preserves state and local

158. Id. at 6.
159. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1) (2012).
160. See, e.g., RAISING THE EXCISE TAX ON CIGARETTES: EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND THE
FEDERAL BUDGET 8–9 (June 2012), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&
source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEEQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cbo.gov%
2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F06-13-Smoking_Reduction.pdf&ei=dnudVbu4DYSbyAT-npf4C
A&usg=AFQjCNEljx6uJlBoTCeM0SvvfuuFyBFOtw&sig2=UiFTDvZoYJx_8iFS017m8Q&bvm
=bv.96952980,d.aWw; CANADIAN CANCER SOC’Y, SURVEYING THE DAMAGE: CUT-RATE
TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE 1900S 24‒25 (Oct. 1999), http://www.nsraadnf.ca/DOCUMENTS/PDFs/oct99taxrep.pdf.
161. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 74 n.1 (1st Cir.
2013).
162. See id. at 81 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that “as of 2009, 25 states had minimum
price laws for cigarettes”); see also Minn. Stat. § 325D.33, subd. 1 (2014) (prohibiting the sale of
cigarettes at less than cost to the retailer or wholesaler for the purpose of injuring a competitor).
163. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(b) (prohibiting the sale of cigarettes in quantities less than
twenty); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 324.07(a) (2013) (prohibiting sales of cigarettes outside of their
original packaging); GARDENA, CAL., CODE § 5.52.090(F)(1) (2015) (prohibiting the sale of cigars
in quantities less than five).
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taxation authority,164 but contains no reference to price regulations outside of the
tax realm. Accordingly, a legal analysis is required before attempting to apply
these non-tax price policy options to menthol tobacco products. Because
menthol cigarettes are a larger public health burden than non-cigarette tobacco
products with a menthol flavoring, it would be critical that any regulation of
menthol apply to menthol cigarettes.165 This Article examines a coupon
regulation first. Because coupons could be considered advertisements, it must
be determined whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA)166 would pose a bar to state or local action.
The FCLAA preempts the ability of state and local governments to adopt any
“requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health . . . with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any” properly labeled cigarettes.167 However, in a
provision adopted as part of the FSPTCA, the FCLAA goes on to permit state or
local “regulations, based on smoking and health . . . imposing specific bans or
restrictions on the time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes.”168
In upholding Providence’s ordinance restricting tobacco product coupon
redemption, the First Circuit found that the ordinance did not regulate the
content of an advertisement; rather, the ordinance merely regulated the
“manner” in which cigarettes were promoted, a practice consistent with the
FCLAA.169 While this decision is not universally dispositive, it does strongly
suggest that a state or local prohibition on the redemption of coupons for
menthol tobacco products would also be upheld.
The second non-tax policy option, a minimum price law for menthol tobacco
products, is a restriction that likely stands on stronger legal footing than coupon
redemption restrictions. In upholding Providence’s coupon ordinance, the First
Circuit noted that twenty-five states have minimum price laws for cigarettes,
which support the notion that these laws would not be preempted by the
FCLAA.170 Although a minimum price law for menthol tobacco products would
likely be upheld, the fact that twenty-five states have such a law in place for
cigarettes generally means that a minimum price law targeted at menthol
products specifically would not make a huge difference in addressing the
problem of menthol unless the minimum price of menthol cigarettes exceeded

164. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1).
165. See Richard J. O’Connor, Non-Cigarette Tobacco Products: What Have We Learned and
Where Are We Headed?, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 180, 184 (2012).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
167. Id. § 1334(b).
168. Id. § 1334(c).
169. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2013).
Arguably, this reasoning is incorrect because coupons relate to the manner of sale and not the
manner of speech.
170. Id.
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the minimum price of nonmenthol cigarettes.171 Consequently, because the
minimum price of menthol cigarettes would already be set in these states, the
law would only be targeting products that do not pose as serious of a public
health problem, i.e., non-cigarette tobacco products with a menthol flavoring.
The third non-tax policy option, a minimum pack size, requires a similar
analysis to the previous policy option. In addition to the many state and local
laws related to pack size already in place—and do not appear to have been
challenged172—a federal regulation limits the pack size of all cigarettes to no
more than twenty.173 Unfortunately, a comparable federal restriction for noncigarette tobacco products does not exist.174 Any minimum pack size regulation
of menthol tobacco products, therefore, would apply only to non-cigarette
tobacco products. This would limit the utility of this approach in the context of
menthol.
It seems that, while all three of these options are on reasonably solid legal
footing, the strongest option from a policy standpoint would be a state or local
prohibition of coupon redemption and multi-pack discounts. Tobacco
manufacturers use coupons and other discounting techniques extensively to
lower the price of their products, making them more widely available.175 This
certainly has an adverse impact on public health in the context of a product like
menthol, which is used more heavily by those of a lower socioeconomic status.
However, this could also suggest that such a policy would have a regressive
effect, similar to the arguments against policies that would tax menthol tobacco
products at a higher rate.
E. Age-of-Sale Regulations
A straightforward approach that could address the problem of menthol in
tobacco products is to raise the minimum age at which the products can be
purchased. Currently, federal law sets the minimum age to purchase tobacco
products at eighteen.176 Several states, cities, and counties, however, have,
raised the minimum purchase age higher than that set by the federal government.
Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey, and Utah have minimum purchase ages of
nineteen.177 Evanston, Illinois, and New York City have a minimum purchase
171. See generally TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, CIGARETTE MINIMUM PRICE
LAW (2011), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-guide-cigminimum
pricelaws-2011.pdf (discussing policy benefits of increased cigarette prices).
172. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
173. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(b) (2014).
174. Michael Freiberg, Options for State and Local Governments to Regulate Non-Cigarette
Tobacco Products, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 407, 428 (2012).
175. B.R. Loomis et al., Point of Purchase Cigarette Promotions Before and After the Master
Settlement Agreement: Exploring Retail Scanner Data, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 140, 140 (2006).
176. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(a).
177. See ALA. CODE § 28-11-2(4) (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.76.100(a)(1) (West
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-13.1(a) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-104(1) (West
2014).
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age of twenty-one.178 Suffolk County, New York, and Hawaii County have an
age limit of twenty-one.179 None of these laws has been overturned, and it seems
fairly clear that the FSPTCA—which allows for state and local regulation of the
“use of tobacco products by individuals of any age”—preserves the authority of
state and local governments to raise the purchase age beyond the federal age of
eighteen.180
If raising the age to purchase all tobacco products is not politically feasible in
a jurisdiction, a strong argument remains to raise the age to purchase menthol
tobacco products, or tobacco products with any flavoring, for that matter. Like
other characterizing flavors, menthol is a common starter product for young
adult and minor smokers.181 Removing the ability of young adults between the
ages of eighteen and twenty to purchase these products legally could have a
positive effect in reducing tobacco initiation.
F. Disclosure Requirements
In addition to allowing state and local governments to increase the age to
purchase tobacco products, the FSPTCA also allows state and local governments
to adopt tobacco control laws related to “information reporting to the State.”182
While some state information reporting laws in the tobacco field relate to the
ingredients of tobacco products,183 they could also conceivably relate to tobacco
marketing.184 Some state laws even go as far as requiring tobacco manufacturers
to disclose their promotional activities.185
178. See Derrick Blakley, Evanston Becomes First Illinois City To Raise Cigarette-Buying Age
To 21, CBS CHI. (Nov. 7, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/11/07/evanstonbecomes-first-illinois-city-to-raise-cigarette-buying-age-to-21/; NYC Gets Tough on Tobacco,
Raises Purchase Age To 21, CNN (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/19/us/new-yorkcity-tobacco-age-law/.
179. Ashley Edwards & James Ford, Suffolk County Raises Tobacco Purchase Age To 21 With
Support From Many Veteran Smokers, PIX11 (Apr. 14, 2014, 7:48 PM), http://pix11.com/2014/04/
14/suffolk-county-raises-tobacco-purchase-age-to-21/; Tobacco Age Limit in Hawaii County Rises
To 21 Next Week, KHON-2 (June 25, 2014, 4:07 PM), http://khon2.com/2014/06/25/tobacco-agelimit-in-hawaii-county-rises-to-21-next-week/.
180. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
181. FDA MENTHOL REPORT, supra note 41, at 6.
182. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1).
183. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 307B (West 2014) (requiring manufacturers
to provide to the department of public health the nicotine yield of their tobacco and “the identity of
any added constituent other than tobacco”).
184. See generally TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, SUNSHINE LAWS: REQUIRING
REPORTING OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY PRICE DISCOUNTING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCE
PAYMENTS TO RETAILERS AND WHOLESALERS (2012), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/
default/files/resources/tclc-guide-sunshinelaws-tobaccocontrol-2012_0.pdf (providing guidance
“for state and local policymakers . . . who are considering requiring disclosure or reporting” of
tobacco marketing practices).
185. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 18:6-4.2 (2004) (requiring advance written notification of
“any manufacturer’s promotional sales plan, including a description of the plan in detail and the
dates and period of time during which the plan is to be operative”).
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A state or local law requiring tobacco manufacturers to disclose amounts spent
on the marketing of menthol tobacco products broken down by geographic area,
e.g. a ZIP code, could provide the public health community with valuable
information. Evidence has shown that tobacco manufacturers disproportionately
promote menthol tobacco products in predominantly low income and minority
areas.186 If a law were to require the production of data showing these
documented marketing disparities, that data could be used to identify improper
advertisement practices, which could provide an impetus for a more substantive
policy addressing menthol, such as a sales restriction.
G. Marketing Restrictions
Modified by the FSPTCA, the FCLAA permits state and local regulations “on
the time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes,” even when those regulations are based on smoking or health.187
Accordingly, any regulation in this area must adhere to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. To be sure, this jurisprudence sets a
high bar for tobacco marketing regulations,188 but it may not be an
insurmountable bar. For example, the First Circuit upheld the Providence
restriction on coupon redemption as an acceptable regulation of “the ‘manner’
of promotion.”189
One can imagine many time, place, and manner restrictions tailored to restrict
menthol, particularly inhibiting the appeal of menthol as a factor in youth
tobacco initiation. A “time” restriction could prohibit the marketing of menthol
tobacco products outdoors or in any place minors can enter before a curfew. A
“place” restriction could prohibit the marketing of menthol tobacco products
outdoors or in a minor accessible facility located within one thousand feet of a
school. Finally, a “manner” restriction could restrict the use of video
advertisements for menthol tobacco products in retail stores that can be entered
by minors.
To be sure, each of these policy options would likely face powerful opposition
from tobacco manufacturers and retailers. The small city of Haverstraw, New
York, for example, adopted a display ban but rescinded the ordinance when
faced with a lawsuit.190 Upon the eventual occurrence of litigation, marketing

186. See Lisa Henriksen et al., Targeted Advertising, Promotion, and Price for Menthol
Cigarettes in California High School Neighborhoods, 14 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH 116,
116 (2012) (finding that tobacco industry records demonstrate a greater focus on marketing menthol
cigarettes in predominantly low-income and minority neighborhoods).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2012).
188. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001) (striking down, on
First Amendment grounds, a Massachusetts height restriction on indoor smokeless tobacco
advertisements).
189. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2013).
190. Laurel E. Curry et al., The Haverstraw Experience: The First Tobacco Product Display
Ban in the United States, 104 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH e9, e9, e11‒12 (2014).
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restriction laws would likely be challenged under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Central Hudson test,191 a test that the Court has used to strike down previous
restrictions on the marketing of tobacco products.192 However, such a regulation
could be upheld if the ordinance was drafted narrowly, for example, including
an exemption for adult-only facilities. In addition, a marketing surveillance
campaign should be implemented in any jurisdiction considering such a law,
considering the appeal of menthol tobacco products to impressionable minors
and young adults. Such a law could have a powerful effect on reducing youth
initiation and would be consistent with internationally-recommended policies on
tobacco marketing.193
IV. CONCLUSION
Historically, state and local governments have had a wide variety of policy
levers available to address the public health problem of tobacco. Although state
and local governments are beginning to address the specific problem of menthol,
many of these same policy options could be used nationwide to address the
serious public health problem posed by menthol tobacco products.194 The policy
option that would likely have the most immediate and greatest positive effect on
public health would be a prohibition or restriction on the sale of all flavored
tobacco products, including menthol cigarettes. Short of that, more modest
options such as raising the age to purchase menthol tobacco products or
requiring tobacco manufacturers to disclose the amount spent on marketing
menthol tobacco products could also have a positive impact on public health and
yield useful information.
To be sure, any of these options would require a large amount of groundwork
in terms of coalition building, data collection, and advocacy. They would also
likely face daunting legal challenges from tobacco manufacturers and retailers.
However, in light of the federal government’s continued failure to take
meaningful action to address this problem, time and resources spent working on
and defending such a policy would be well spent.

191. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). The test requires the Court to inquire “whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment” and “whether the asserted government interest is substantial.” Id. If both of these
questions “yield positive answers,” then the Court considers “whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and . . . is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.” Id.
192. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 567.
193. See FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 83, at 11 (calling on
member nations to “undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, promotion and
sponsorship” if consistent with that nation’s constitution).
194. See supra Part III (discussing state and local sales restrictions, taxation schemes, age
restrictions, and other policy solutions).

